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Australia’s household sector appears to hold a greater proportion of its wealth
in dwellings than do households in other countries. Average dwelling prices in
Australia also appear to be high relative to household income, but dwellings in
Australia are not noticeably higher in quality than those in comparable countries.
This concentration of wealth in housing also does not seem attributable to
government policies that encourage dwelling investment in Australia to a greater
extent than is true overseas. A possible reconciliation of this pattern may be
the unusual concentration of Australia’s population in two large cities. Average
housing prices tend to be higher in larger cities than smaller ones. Therefore,
the expensive cities in Australia drag up the average level of dwelling prices
more than in other countries, resulting in a higher share of wealth concentrated
in housing. The increasing importance of dwelling wealth in Australia over recent
years largely reﬂects the consequences of disinﬂation and ﬁnancial deregulation.
This is most likely a transitional effect, and the ratio of dwelling wealth to income
should stabilise, or begin to grow more slowly, in the future.
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iiiCITY SIZES, HOUSING COSTS, AND WEALTH
Luci Ellis and Dan Andrews
1. Introduction
Australia’s household sector appears to hold a greater proportion of its wealth
in dwellings than do households in other countries. This does not appear to be
due to greater quality of the housing stock in Australia than in other comparable
countries. Since the measure of dwelling wealth used in household wealth
calculations includes all private dwellings, this difference similarly cannot be
due to differences in home ownership rates. Alternatively, this pattern in the
composition of wealth could be a consequence of public-policy decisions that
make the purchase of dwellings relatively more attractive in Australia than in
comparable countries.
In this paper, we present evidence against this explanation. We focus instead on
an alternative explanation which relies on the observation that housing costs are
high in Australia’s two largest cities, Sydney and Melbourne. Housing is usually
more expensive in large cities than in smaller cities, particularly those cities that
dominate other urban regions. The two largest cities in Australia account for a
much larger proportion of the total urban population in Australia than is the case
in most other developed countries. Therefore, the expensive cities in Australia
raise the average level of dwelling prices more than in other countries, resulting in
a higher share of wealth concentrated in housing.
This concentration of population in the two largest cities is a result of the unusual
structure of Australia’s urban population. To a ﬁrst approximation, the populations
of cities in many countries are in inverse proportion to their ranking by population
size; that is, the second-largest city is roughly half the size of the largest, the
third-largest one-third the size and so on. This empirical regularity is an example
of a power law, and is known as the rank-size rule or Zipf’s Law. Australia’s
large towns and cities follow an approximate rank-size power law, but with a
ﬂatter distribution than other countries. Sydney and Melbourne together therefore
account for ‘too much’ of the urban population of Australia, raising the national
average price of dwellings and the share of dwellings in household wealth.2
Although this geographic explanation for the structure of Australian households’
balance sheets is not the only plausible one, it is consistent with the data and does
not rely on presumed differences in preferences. The available data do not suggest
that Australians have a greater preference for housing than residents of other
developed economies, or that government policy encourages dwelling investment
to a greater extent than does policy elsewhere.
The characteristics of housing also support a geographical explanation. Housing
differs from the standard neoclassical good; it is heterogenous and its spatial
ﬁxity means that the location of the housing stock matters to households (Smith,
Rosen and Fallis 1988). Housing is thus imperfectly substitutable across locations
(Maclean 1994). These factors, combined with construction lags make housing
supply inelastic in the short run, so the housing market is prone to rapid increases
in dwelling prices (housing price booms). The relative dominance of the larger
cities may therefore also help explain Australia’s susceptibility to housing-price
booms. In countries with less concentrated urban populations, price booms in one
city have less effect on national average prices.
To the extent that averagedwelling pricesarehigher inAustralia, somehouseholds
might respond by reducing their demand for housing services. At the margin,
renters would shift their consumption away from housing and downgrade to
lower-quality dwellings. However, owner-occupiers’ housing demand is both a
consumption and investment decision, so their response is less clear (Henderson
and Ioannides 1983). It seems likely that any demand substitution would only
partially offset the initial increase in dwelling prices.
The question of why Australia’s population structure is different remains. The
broad similarity with Canada suggests that our federal structure has resulted in
state capital cities acting as primate cities dominating the surrounding regions.
This will tend to ﬂatten out the rank-size relationship. It is also possible that large
countries with small populations – like Canada but unlike the United Kingdom –
have ﬂatter rank-size relationships because the large distances between population
centres increase transport costs. If so, the structure of the household balance sheet
in Australia would not require a policy response, but rather would be partly a
necessary implication of our geography and political history.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we document the importance
of dwelling wealth in the household sector’s balance sheet in Australia and other3
developed countries, and critically examine some possible explanations of the
high level in Australia. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the literature and
empirical evidence about the distribution of city sizes. The data conﬁrm that
Zipf’s Law is a reasonable ﬁrst approximation to the distribution of city sizes.
We also show that Australia’s urban structure accounts for around one-third of the
difference between the wealth-income ratios in Australia and the United States.
Section 4 shows that the effects of urban structure on national average housing
prices might only occur if households’ ﬁnancial behaviour is not constrained by
either ﬁnancial regulation or the interaction between capital market imperfections
and inﬂation. Section 5 develops a simple model of city sizes with housing costs
consistent with the observation that larger cities have more expensive housing.
Therefore, the more important are the large cities in the total population,the higher
will be the national average level of dwelling costs. The conclusion in Section 6
draws out some of the macroeconomic implications of Australia’s relatively large
share of dwellings in household wealth, and in particular, argues that a dramatic
fall in dwelling prices is unlikely.
2. Dwellings and Household Wealth
2.1 Measuring Dwelling Wealth
Measurement of the value of the stock of dwelling wealth is in principle as
simple as counting the number of dwellings, and multiplying by an appropriately
weighted estimate of the average prices of those dwellings. The ﬁrst part can be
generated in a straightforward way using national census data, and interpolated
between census dates using information on dwelling completions. The second
part, which must be available in local currency values rather than as an index
number(as isthe casewith the ABS HousePrice Index),is moredifﬁcult toobtain.
Some statistical agencies publish estimates of the value of the dwelling stock as
part of the country’s national accounts. However, national accounting principles
do not capture the market price of dwellings, including land value, which is
what matters for household wealth. Similarly, implicit price deﬂators for dwelling
investment from national accounts do not correspond to market prices of the
existing dwelling stock because they generally exclude land and are based on the
composition of new dwellings, not the stock of existing dwellings. Price deﬂators4
also exclude the effects of increasing dwelling quality, for example where new
houses are larger on average than those built previously. However, these effects
clearly add to households’ dwelling wealth.
The most appropriate sources for data on the market value of dwellings are those
based on prices of existing dwellings sold. These series are sometimes collected
by national statistical agencies but are more likely to be published by ﬁnancial
institutions or real estate associations. Dwelling prices are frequently used as an
indicator of more general price pressures (Girouard and Bl¨ ondal 2001). Therefore
many published series on sale prices abstract from compositional effects, or relate
only to speciﬁc markets or types of housing – for example, detached houses in
major urban areas, houses for which past sale prices are known, or dwellings of
a standardised size. These adjustments ensure that the series are close to a pure
price signal, but are unhelpful when trying to determine the market value of the
total dwelling stock.
Appropriate measures of the market price of dwellings must include all regions
of the country, and apartments and townhouses as well as detached houses. For
this reason, the Reserve Bank uses data from the Housing Industry Association’s
Housing Report, based on prices paid by customers of the Commonwealth
Bank. Unlike the other dwelling price series available in Australia such as
those from the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA) and the ABS, these
data include all dwellings, not just detached houses, and cover non-metropolitan
regions. However, we are therefore implicitly assuming that Commonwealth Bank
customers are representative of all home-buyers. The CBA/HIA prices tend to be
higher than those reported by the REIA; it is difﬁcult to say which is correct,
given that the CBA/HIA series is otherwise conceptually superior. However, if
the CBA/HIA data did overstate the true level of housing prices in Australia, we
would have a smaller distance from the dwelling wealth levels of other countries
to explain.
Even when conceptually correct measures of sale prices are available, some
aspects of their construction can still create biases in estimates of dwelling stock
values. Measured values can be biased down by the use of median rather than
average prices, for what is likely to be a left-skewed distribution. There is also a
potential bias in average dwelling-price measures if different types of dwellings
turn over at different rates: the composition of dwellings sold would therefore5
differ from that of dwellings standing.Countries with large public-housing sectors
could have overstated dwelling wealth unless these dwellings are excluded.1
Similarly, if privately rented dwellings are owned by corporations, not other
households, their exclusion could reduce measures of dwelling wealth, especially
in countries with low owner-occupation rates.2
Table 1: Non-ﬁnancial Assets as a Share of Total Assets
Per cent
1987 1990 1993 1996 1999
Australia 55 68 63 63 64
Canada 47 46 45 43 42
France 61 57 51 50 na
Germany na 67 65 64 60
Italy 53 51 50 48 na
Japan 65 63 57 51 na
UK 55 55 45 42 42
US 39 38 35 32 28
Sweden(a) 49 53 51 47 45
New Zealand 58 61 57 61 60
Note: (a) 1999 data refer to 1998.
Sources: Mylonas, Schich and Wehinger (2000); RBA; RBNZ
With these data caveats in mind, Table 1 shows the shares of non-ﬁnancial assets
in total householdwealth forcountriesfor which we havesufﬁcient data. Although
these data include consumer durables for all countries except New Zealand,
non-ﬁnancial assets are dominated by the dwelling stock. A decade and a half
ago, Australia’s household balance sheet contained a non-ﬁnancial asset share
around the international average. Since then, the share in most other countries has
fallen or stayed fairly constant, while in Australia the share has risen by almost
10 percentage points. This divergence is not due to differences in the relative
importance of ﬁnancial assets: household holdings of ﬁnancial assets in Australia
1 The measure of dwelling wealth in household wealth calculations is based upon private
dwellings. Since this measure is expressed as a percentage of household disposable income,
the inclusion of public housing would inﬂate this estimate because households do not own
them.
2 Whilst thiseffect is likelyto be smallin mostcountries, it will be more importantin Continental
Europe (especially France, Germany and Italy) where some rental housing is ﬁnanced by large
businesses.6
are not particularly low relative to those in other developed countries. Rather,
housing is expensive relative to income in Australia.
The ratio of aggregate dwelling wealth to disposable income is roughly equivalent
to the ratio of average dwelling prices to average disposable income; the ratios
will only differ to the extent that there is a difference between the number of
private-sector dwellings and the number of households (this difference is marginal
in Australia).3 Table 2 shows this measure of dwelling prices is relatively high
in Australia, and grew fairly steadily through the 1990s, reaching 378 per cent
by late 2000. While some nations (Japan, UK, Sweden) experienced rapid
run-ups in dwelling prices, these booms ultimately led to busts, and price-income
ratios in those countries returned to levels closer to those in other countries
(Henley 1998). Of this group of countries, only New Zealand has followed
Australia in experiencing sustained growth in relative housing prices.
Table 2: Housing Wealth as Per Cent to Household Disposable Income
1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Australia 248 239 281 303 355
Canada 123 – 118 129 129
France(a) 172 – 218 218 227
Germany(a) –– 331 302 301
Italy 133 – 170 172 166
Japan(b) 380 397 641 429 381
UK 343 357 361 252 293
US 169 170 173 155 163
Sweden(b) 208 184 245 182 198
New Zealand 185 237 243 278 283
Notes: (a) 1998 data refer to 1997.
(b) Figures refer to non-ﬁnancial assets which include consumer durables as well as dwellings.
Sources: Bundesbank; Mylonas et al (2000); OECD; RBA; RBNZ
Some increase in dwelling prices should have been expected through the 1990s in
Australia. Following ﬁnancial deregulation, households now enjoy greater access
to loan ﬁnance for the purchase of dwellings. Reinforcing this trend, the move
to low inﬂation over that period enabled households to service larger mortgages
and therefore purchase more expensive homes (Stevens 1997). These factors
3 Holiday homes and vacant rental properties can result in the number of private-sector dwellings
exceeding the number of households.7
would be expected to increase demand for dwellings and put upward pressure on
dwelling prices. Household indebtedness also increased substantially during this
period, reﬂecting these changes, bringing Australia to around the average level of
indebtedness seen in other comparable countries; we discuss these issues in more
detail in Section 4. However, these changes do not explain why the increase in
dwelling prices since the 1990s has resulted in Australia having relatively more
expensive housing than other low-inﬂation countries. These changes explain the
increase in dwelling prices and indebtedness, but not why the price level has
increased from around the average to well above international averages.
This divergence in the dwelling wealth-income ratio, if sustained, implies that
different countries have different relative prices of housing in the long run.
We consider an explanation for this based on unobservable and unexplained
differences in preferences for housing to be unsatisfactory, and inconsistent with
the evidence on housing quality presented in Table 4. The ranking of countries
by dwelling wealth-income ratio does not obviously follow differences in average
income, so these variations in the relative price of housing are also not obviously
attributable to housing services being either a superior or inferior good.
2.2 The Relative Attractiveness of Dwelling Wealth
Despite the limitations of the data presented in the previous section, they clearly
suggest that Australians have concentrated a larger portion of their wealth in
housing than their counterparts in other developed economies, and spend a larger
proportion of their incomes to purchase a home. The ﬁrst step in ﬁnding the
reasons for this result is to establish whether there are government policies or
other factors that could have contributed to it. Tax policies such as exclusion from
capital gains tax can make owner-occupied dwellings relatively more attractive
than other forms of investment, and thus cause over-investment in dwellings.
It is also important to assess whether there is a greater revealed preference for
dwellings in the sense of their being larger or higher-quality in Australia than
elsewhere. Tables 3 and 4 present indicators for these factors for Australia and the
other countries for which we have dwelling wealth data.8













Australia No Yes 5
￿17 0
￿1
Canada No Yes 1
￿76 3
￿7
France Yes(a) Yes 17
￿05 6
￿0
Germany Yes Yes 26
￿04 3
￿0(b)
Italy Yes(c) Yes 6
￿06 8
￿0
Japan No No(d) 7
￿06 0
￿3
UK Yes(e) Yes 24
￿06 9
￿0
US Yes Yes(f) 1
￿26 7
￿4
Sweden Yes No 22
￿0(g) 56
￿0
New Zealand No Yes 6
￿47 1
￿2
Notes: Data are latest available. See Appendix B for detailed information on sources and reference periods. There
are other more targeted policies that encourage homeownership across countries (Miron 2001). Although
these policies can vary across countries, their net effect seems less signiﬁcant because their coverage is
generally limited.
(a) Interest is deductible for the ﬁrst ﬁve years. The deduction is equivalent to 25 per cent of the total
interest bill, subject to a ceiling based on the date of the contract and age of the building.
(b) West Germany only.
(c) A tax credit of 27 per cent of interest payments is allowed up to a ceiling.
(d) A special deduction of
U30 000 000 can be claimed for the principal residence.
(e) Mortgage interest deductible only on the ﬁrst £30 000 of a mortgage.
(f) Capital gains is theoretically subject to tax. However,any capital gains from the sale of the family home
when another dwelling costing at least as much is purchased within two years of the sale is exempt from
taxation. A once-in-a-lifetime exclusion of US $125 000 also exists for people over 55 years.
(g) Excludes co-operative sector.
Owner-occupied housing is tax-advantaged in Australia, but some developed
countries apply an even greater range of tax incentives toward home ownership,
including deductibility of mortgage interest payments (Table 3). Past theoretical
worksuggeststhat deductibilityofmortgage interestrepresentsa greaterdistortion
than capital gains tax exemption (Britten-Jones and McKibbin 1989).4 On this
4 One policy encouraging home ownership in Australia that is not seen elsewhere is the exclusion
of owner-occupied dwellings from means and assets tests that can restrict access to government
pensions. This encourages pensioners to hold onto larger homes rather than trade down
to something smaller, thus restricting the supply of family-sized homes available to larger
households. This tax advantage to owner-occupied housing is not applicable in other countries
because their welfare systems are not means tested in the same way.9
basis, we would expect that if anything, Australia’s housing stock is less affected
by over-investment than those of some other developed countries.
The quality of the Australian dwelling stock is comparable with that in some
other countries. However, Australia has a greater proportion of detached houses,
suggesting somewhat more land-intensive housing patterns, and the share of
relatively new homes built in the past 20 years is somewhat higher, due to
Australia’s relatively high population growth (Table 4). Dwellings in Australia
appear to be similar in size to those in other non-European developed countries.
Although dwellings are larger on average here than in Europe, this is partly
because households are larger; the number of persons per room is around the
average for developed countries.
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Notes: Data are latest available. Proportion of houses in dwellings refers to all single-family dwellings including
townhouses and terraces. See Appendix B for detailed information on sources and reference periods.
(a) West Germany only. Dwellings built column refers to dwellings built since 1979, not 1980.
(b) Existing dwelling size and detached house data refer to Auckland.
(c) Excludes public housing.
(d) Refers to ﬁve or more rooms. The average number of rooms in Canada is six.
(e) Since 1975.
(f) England only.
The rate of home ownership in Australia is higher than a number of the
countries shown in Table 3, but there are many other countries with similar
ownership rates, including New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Spain10
(European Parliament 1996). Home ownership tends to increase average housing
prices because owner-occupiers internalise the cost of the wear and tear they
create in their home, while renters might not fully bear such costs (Henderson
and Ioannides 1983). Owner-occupiers therefore require a lower gross return than
landlords, and are thus in theory willing to pay more for a given dwelling in the
absence of differences in tax treatment.
On the other hand, ownership of private rental properties also attracts favourable
tax treatment in many OECD countries (Miron 2001). Negative gearing tax
provisions in many countries allow landlords to deduct interest payments against
income from other sources if they exceed rental income net of expenses, while tax
credits and loan subsidies apply in France (Cardew, Parnell and Randolph 2000).
These tax provisions generally ensure that owners of rented dwellings receive the
same tax treatment as owners of other commercial properties (Weicher 2000).
Since they are common across developed countries, Australia’s negative gearing
provisions do not represent a relatively greater incentive to invest in rental
properties. In the UK by contrast, mortgage interest cannot be deducted against
rental or other income (Miron 2001). This may be discouraging the expansion of
the existing small private rental sector there.
Although previous studies have found evidence of over-investment in housing in
Australia, the evidence that this over-investment is greater than in other countries
is weak (Bourassa and Hendershott 1992). Therefore tax policies do not appear to
explain the divergence in the stock of housing wealth between Australia and other
developed countries; to do so, the incentives for over-investment would have to
be stronger here than elsewhere. The concern about over-investment is probably
better directed at countries that allow tax deductibility of interest payments on
owner-occupiers’ mortgages (Mills 1987).
2.3 Dwelling Prices in Different Cities
Figure 1 indicates that city sizes and city-level house prices are related. Although
city-speciﬁcf actors also matter, larger cities usually have higher average housing
prices than smaller cities in the same country, even after allowing for variation in11
incomes, which are also usually higher in larger cities. Then if large cities make
up a relatively large share of the population, the national average dwelling price
will be higher than if the same population was spread over a larger number of
smaller cities.5
Figure 1: US and Australian House Prices by City







































































































































Sources: CBA/HIA for Australia; National Association of Realtors for US
There are a number of possible reasons for this relationship between city size and
dwelling prices. Income differentials are clearly important for explaining the high
level of dwelling prices in big cities. Mori and Turrini (2000) argue that transport
and communication costs encourage higher-skilled workers to concentrate into
large urban centres, while Glaeser and Mar´ e (2001) suggest that the observed
wage premium paid in larger cities reﬂects endogenous improvements to human
5 This assumes that there is no systematic negative relationship between house prices in large
cities and the share of large cities in the national population. The trend line for US data was
estimated by OLS. The coefﬁcient on population is clearly signiﬁcant using White’s correction
for heteroskedasticity. If we regress (log) house prices on log income and population, instead
of the price-income ratio on population, the coefﬁcient on population remains signiﬁcant, while
the coefﬁcient on income is not signiﬁcantly different from 1.12
capital arising from lower search costs and greater specialisation. However, this
cannot be the whole story, as dwelling prices are high relative to income in
larger cities, as well as in absolute terms (Figure 1; Table 5).6 This may be
because housing demand represents an increasing share of expenditure as income
increases: preferences may not be homothetic or wealth may increase faster than
income.7 Other reasonsincludethat larger cities offermoreamenities anda greater
range of job opportunities. In equilibrium, these beneﬁts will be balanced against
greater costs, such as congestion, crime and higher housing costs (Gabaix 1999b).
Table 5: Dwelling Prices by City Relative to Disposable Income, 1998/99
City Population Average income Dwelling price-income ratio
’000 Per cent of national
average
Disposable income Gross income
Sydney 4 041.4 113
￿1 8.06 5
￿64
Melbourne 3 417.2 113
￿2 4.69 3
￿51
Brisbane 1 601.4 97
￿1 5.16 3
￿92
Perth 1 364.2 100
￿4 4.87 3
￿76









Notes: These price-income ratios are not strictly comparable with the national data in Table 2. Survey data
understate national accounts disposable income, and number of households does not equal the number
of dwellings.
Sources: See Appendix B
6 As shown in Figure 1, the divergence increased between 1998 and 2000. Canadian housing
prices also show a roughly rising relationship, but this is dominated by unusually high housing
prices in British Columbia and low prices in Quebec.
7 It might also be because large cities are space-constrained, limiting supply and putting upward
pressure on dwelling prices.13
3. The Distribution of City Sizes
3.1 Zipf’s Law
Australia’s apparently more expensive housing does not seem to be due to
differences in government policy or household preferences. An alternative
candidate explanation for the importance of housing wealth in Australia is that the
urban population is concentrated in two large cities with relatively high housing
costs. In most developed and many developing countries, the population size and
population ranks of cities are distributed approximately according to a power
law. This means that if a country’s urban centres are ordered by population size,
the rank of city S (largest
￿ 1, second-largest
￿ 2, and so on) has an inverse









where a and ζ are positive constants. This empirical regularity can be
demonstrated graphically by plotting the natural logarithm of the rank of each
city against the natural logarithm of its population size. Figures 2–4 show
this relationship for a range of developed and developing countries. When the
exponent ζ equals 1, this empirical regularity is known as Zipf’s Law (Zipf 1949),
corresponding to a slope of
 1 for the lines in these ﬁgures.8
8 Gabaix (1999b) showed that cities with populations that grew randomly would converge to a
distribution matching Zipf’s Law (ζ
￿ 1) in its upper tail, provided that the growth rates for
all cities were drawn from a statistical distribution with the same mean and variance, and that
the cities were bounded to be above some minimum size. The existence of such a common
distribution is called Gibrat’s Law. If this is not true, then Zipf’s Law does not hold; Zipf’s Law
should therefore be seen as a diagnostic for the underlying growth process, rather than a law
that must hold in all cases and at all times. Earlier work on explaining Zipf’s Law centred on
variations of this requirement for random growth from a common distribution. Simon (1955)
developed a simple model with additions to the population attaching to existing cities with
probability equal to its share of total population. Hill (1974) formalised this proportionality of
probability to population as a Bose-Einstein occupancy problem. Gibrat’s Law has also been
used to study the size distributions of ﬁrms, income distributions and other economic variables;
see Sutton (1997) for a review.14





















































Some empirical support for Zipf’s Law has been shown for US cities through
time (Krugman 1996; Ioannides and Dobkins 2000), while international evidence
has been more mixed (Kamecke 1990). Recent literature on this power law has
presented OLS estimates of the slope of this ‘Zipf curve’ as evidence of the
exponent ζ being 1. Although OLS is not an ideal estimation method when the15




























left-hand side variable is the log of an integer, maximum-likelihood estimates give
similar results (Kamecke 1990; Urz´ ua 2000).9
Although the evidence is mixed, a power law seems to be a reasonable ﬁrst
approximationofthe dataformanycountries.Incontrast,modelsofcity formation
based on economic ﬁrst principles such as the location decisions of workers and
owners of capital have generally failed to capture the size distribution seen in the
data. For example, Henderson’s (1974) model could only generate city sizes that
varied at all by introducing different traded-goods industries facing (unexplained)
differences in production-function parameters; there was no mechanism for
generating the observed power law except by assumption. It would be equally
misguided, however, to develop a theory that could only generate a Zipf-type
power law distribution.
As indicated in the ﬁgures above, the rank-size relationship of Australian cities
differs noticeably from the predictions of Zipf’s Law, and the relationships seen
in other countries. This is conﬁrmed by estimates of the power law exponent
￿ζ
￿
9 The OLS estimates are based on an inappropriate speciﬁcation of the errors, so their standard
errors and t-statistics are not meaningful and we have not reported them here. The residuals for
both sets of estimates have a cyclical pattern; similar-sized cities tend to have residuals of the
same sign. Explaining this is beyond the scope of the paper, but it suggests that there is more to
the city-size distribution than a simple power law.16
Table 6: Indicators of City Population Structure
Zipf curve exponent estimates Share of urban
population in
Primacy ratio(a)






















































































multiplier test of ζ
￿ 1 rejected at 5 per cent and 1 per cent signiﬁcance levels.
(a) Ratio of largest city to second-largest. If Zipf’s Law is true, this ratio should be 2.
Sources: See Appendix B
for different countries (Table 6). The point estimates for Australia using either
estimation method are below that for all the other countries except China, which
has a city-size structure completely different from a power law. The plot of log
rank against log size for China is nowhere near linear, for reasons we can only
speculate about.
Australia’s low ζ implies that city populations are lower further down the rank
ordering than Zipf’s Law predicts. Indeed, Australia has no middle-sized cities
according to the UN deﬁnition of between 500 000 and 1 million inhabitants. In
1999, Newcastle, the sixth-largest had around 480 000 residents and Adelaide,
the ﬁfth-largest city had 1.09 million. By contrast, Australia’s small towns follow17
Zipf’s Law very closely: estimates of ζ for the set of towns with populations
between 5000 and about 80000 are very close to 1. This suggests that population
growth behaves in roughly the same way across Australia’s small towns, but that
small towns as a group behave differently from large towns and cities. The result
is surprising, given that the literature ﬁnds that Zipf’s Law usually holds in the
upper tail of the city-size distribution (Gabaix 1999b).
Why does Australia have so few middle-sized cities, resulting in such a low ζ in
the upper tail of the city-size distribution? One circumstance where the estimated
Zipf coefﬁcient could be lower than 1 is where smaller cities had lower average
growth rates or higher variances of their growth rates than the larger cities. A
lower mean growth rate could occur if natural population increase is roughly
the same nationwide, but larger cities systematically attract residents away from
smaller cities. Similarly, smaller cities might have narrower industrial bases and
thus be more susceptible to industrial shocks, leading to population growth having
a higher variance than in larger cities (Gabaix 1999b).
3.2 The Primate City and Deviations from Zipf’s Law
Models of the development of city sizes based on random growth from a common
distribution can explain the rank-size rule observed in the population structures
of many countries. However, other countries have only one signiﬁcant city, or a
city that is much larger than would be expected based on the Zipf power law. In
the geography literature, these are referred to as primate cities (Jefferson 1939).10
Zipf’s Law predicts that the largest city in a country should be double the size
of the next largest – a good approximation for many countries. In countries with
primate cities, however, it can be six to eight times as large as the next-largest
city, and well out of line with the power law describing the relative sizes of the
smaller cities in that country. The primacy ratio is the ratio of the largest to the
second-largest city. If Zipf’s Law holds, this primacy ratio should be around 2; if
it is above 3, the largest city is considered a primate city.11
10 Countries with obvious primate cities include Argentina, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece
Indonesia, Norway and the United Kingdom.
11 Thresholds for deﬁning primate cities have evolved over time. Jefferson’s (1939) original
deﬁnition of a primate city was one that was more than twice as large as the next-largest city,
that is, any upward deviation from Zipf’s Law.18
Australia is often considered to be a country with no primate city. It is certainly
true that Sydney’s population is substantially less than twice that of Melbourne.
Even if Newcastle, Wollongong and the Central Coast are included in Sydney’s
population as a single conurbation, Sydney’s population is well below what would
be predicted from the rank-size relationship of the other cities.
One plausible view of Australia’s urban structure is that each state capital is
a primate city for its state, and that its population size relative to other state
capitals is less relevant. Hill (1974) demonstrated that if the cities in each region
of a country follow Zipf’s Law, then the rank-size relationship for the whole
country will also be approximately consistent with Zipf’s Law. As mentioned
earlier, the rank-size distribution for Australian towns with fewer than 80 000
inhabitants – that is, smaller than Hobart, the smallest of the state capitals – is
close to that predicted by Zipf’s Law, but larger cities have a ﬂatter rank-size
relationship. This is consistent with Australia’s nationwide rank-size relationship
being a combination of several state rank-size relations where the largest city is
a primate, while all the others follow Zipf’s Law. It also clearly suggests that
smaller towns are subject to random growth of a common nature, while the state
and national capitals evolve according to different forces.
Canada also has a relatively ﬂat rank-size curve and a federal political system.
Provincial capitals tend to attract residents from other parts of the province
because their positions as the seat of government results in these cities offering
employment opportunities in administration and policy that are not available
elsewhere.12 Unlike Australia, the provincial capitals in Canada are not usually
the largest cities in the provinces. This may help explain both why Canada’s Zipf
curve is not asﬂat as Australia’s, and why dwelling prices are lower there; demand
pressures on housing from internal migration will be spread over two cities in each
province – the economic centre and the political centre. The difference may reﬂect
the history of colonisation by European settlers, and this may help explain the
current urban structure.
12 These opportunities are in addition to the normal range of private-sector occupations seen in a
city of that size, rather than a substitute for them. By contrast, manufactured political capitals
such as Brasilia, Canberra or Islamabad have narrower employmentbases focused on the public
sector. This may explain why these capitals do not become primate cities.19
Because both these countries have relatively small populations spread over a large
area, transport costs and political institutions may have induced multiple centres
of economic activity, resulting in the formation of a primate city for each region.
In more densely populated countries such as the United Kingdom, transport costs
are less important. A single primate city may arise in those countries, but there
may be little impetus for others to form, as centralised administrative functions
can cover the entire country, without subsidiary regional centres to cover some
areas. Ades andGlaeser (1995)foundthat a relative lack oftransportinfrastructure
tended to foster centralisation into large cities. Sparsely populated countries such
as Australia and Canada have fairly sparse transport infrastructure relative to more
densely populated developed countries. This may be encouraging the relatively
high concentration of these countries’ populations into a few cities, albeit on a
regional rather than national basis.
3.3 Implications of the Urban Structure for Dwelling Wealth
As a rule, primate cities account for a greater fraction of the total population than
would a largest city that followed Zipf’s Law. Larger cities tend to have more
expensive housing than smaller cities, so the national average housing price will
be higher as the primacy ratio rises, even if housing prices in individual cities
are unaffected by this change. Holding national population ﬁxed, an increase in
the primacy ratio (or the concentration of population in the largest city) reduces
both the absolute population and relative share of the other cities, which may be
expected to reduce their average housing prices. Nonetheless, the national average
housing price will rise if the population share of the largest city rises, given
reasonable assumptions about the functional form of the relationship between
population and housing prices at the city level.13 This implies that if a primate
city exists, or more generally, the population is concentrated in a few large cities,
national average housing costs tend to be higher than would be true if Zipf’s Law
held.
How important is this urban structure effect? Our best guess is that it accounts for
about one-third of the difference between the dwelling wealth-income ratios of
13 In particular, this will hold if house prices in individual cities are a rising function of population
with a second derivative that is always non-zero; a proof of this is available on request. The
result also holds for some cases where h
￿
￿
￿ 0a tsome point.20
Australia and the United States. Although this estimate is necessarily rough, we
believe it conveys the correct order of magnitude, if not the exact ﬁgure.
Recall Figure 1 in Section 2.3, which showed housing price-income ratios for
individual cities in Australia and the United States. Other than Sydney, the ratios
for Australian cities are only somewhat above the average value for US cities of
comparable size, and just above the bounds of US experience. We estimated a line
of best ﬁt for housing price-income ratios in US cities, given their populations
(this is the trend line shown on Figure 1). We used the ﬁtted values to derive the
price-income ratios they implied for cities equal in size to each of Australia’s
major cities. Multiplying these ratios by a measure of income for each city,
comparable to those used in the disaggregated US data, gives a counterfactual
price for Australian housing (Table 7). These are the prices that would prevail in
Australia if the US relationship between city size and price-income ratios also
applied to Australia.
Table 7: Actual and Counterfactual Australian Dwelling Prices by City
Per cent to city-level median household gross income, June quarter 1998






















Sources: See Appendix B
The counterfactual prices can be aggregated along with actual data for
non-metropolitan housing prices, to derive a national average dwelling price and
thus a counterfactual ratio to disposable income comparable to the ﬁgures in
Table 2.14 The difference between this counterfactual price-income ratio and the
US ﬁgureinTable 2representstheurbanstructureeffect–thepartofthedifference
14 To be consistent with the data in Table 2, the weights used to aggregate the city data are slightly
different from the population data used in Section 3.1. We also use 1998/99 data for Australia,
not the 2000 data shown in Figure 1.21
between the two countries’ ratios attributable to the greater concentration of
Australia’s population in larger, more expensive cities. As shown in Table 8, the
counterfactual ratio of price to disposable income for Australia is 2
￿29, implying
that the urban structure effect accounts for around one-third of the gap between
the US and Australian ratios.
Table 8: Actual and Counterfactual Dwelling Prices







US actual data (Flow of funds housing prices, 1997) 2
￿76 1
￿63(a)
US actual data (Realtors housing prices, 1997) 2
￿93 1
￿72
Australian actual data 5
￿01 3
￿55(a)
Australian counterfactual data 3
￿48 2
￿29
Note: (a) These ﬁgures are also reported in Table 2
Sources: See Appendix B.
We have made a number of assumptions on the way to obtaining this estimate.
Firstly, we used data on prices for detached houses, not all dwellings, in individual
US cities from the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Although these seem
roughly comparable with the data underlying the ﬂow of funds wealth estimates,
we cannotbe surehow different they are.However, the differencebetween average
detached house prices and total dwelling prices in Australia is not large, so this
probably does not make much difference to the estimated urban structure effect.
Secondly, the non-metropolitan house price data for the US and Australia are not
strictly comparable. The NAR does not publish data for non-metropolitan homes
(those located in cities with less than 100 000 inhabitants), so we assume a ratio
of price to gross income of 1
￿5 for non-metropolitan areas to derive the national
averages shown in the second row of Table 8. This ﬁgure seems reasonable: it is
roughly comparable with the price-income ratios of the smallest cities in the NAR
data and the national accounts estimate in Table 2. However, we cannot make
this assumption for non-metropolitan houses in Australia. The non-metropolitan
Australian price data (the CBA/HIA’s ’Rest of State’ series) is highly aggregated
and does not distinguish between regional centres (with populations over 100 000)22
and small towns. Consequently, we use the actual data for the non-metropolitan
prices, making the counterfactual a statement about capital-city dwelling prices.15
Thirdly, US data on household income by city is from the Current Population
Survey which, like Australia’s Household Expenditure Survey, reports lower
income than the national accounts. The data are also only available as median
gross income, not average disposable income. Cross-country differences in the
gap between survey measures of income and the national accounts are therefore
built into our estimate of the urban structure effect, perhaps inﬂating it.
Of course, this estimate assumes that the average price-income ratio for cities of
the same absolute size is the appropriate basis for cross-country comparison, and
that the level of dwelling prices in the US is at an equilibrium. Relative city sizes
clearly matter for housing costs within countries, but without city-level dwelling
price and income data for a wider range of countries, we cannot say whether
dwelling prices vary with absolute population or relative rank. If cities in different
countries with the same rank should have the same price-income ratio, given
preferences and other factors, then we should compare Sydney with New York or
Los Angeles, not Houston or Atlanta, as we have effectively done in this paper. In
that case, the counterfactual price-income ratio for Sydney would be much closer
to the actual value, and our estimate of the urban structure effect would be closer
to half the gap between the US and Australian data.
4. Deregulation, Disinﬂation and Housing Wealth Dynamics
The previous sections set out what we believe to be a plausible partial explanation
of the current distribution of relative housing prices across countries. If Australia
had always had relatively high housing wealth, our story would end there.
However, in the early 1980s, Australia’s ratio of dwelling prices to income was not
obviously different from those in other countries, and Australia’s households had
much lower debt than households in many other countries. As mentioned earlier,
we attribute this to constraints imposed on dwelling prices by high inﬂation and
ﬁnancial regulation. However, the extent to which housing was tax-advantaged
was also important, because that tended to dampen the effects of high inﬂation
15 This might introduce some upward bias to our counterfactual national average if actual prices
are higher than the average US income ratios would suggest. However, we do not have separate
price series for these cities, so we cannot tell how important this is.23
and regulation. In countries such as Australia, where government intervention
in the housing market did not offset the effects of inﬂation very much, actual
dwelling wealth was further from its desired ratio to income prior to deregulation.
Therefore, after deregulation and disinﬂation, these countries had further to travel
to reach their desired level of dwelling wealth. The market adjustment in Australia
was particularly prolonged, as dwelling prices in the larger cities had to converge
to a higher long-run equilibrium, as determined by Australia’s urban structure.
When the ﬁnancial sector is regulated, credit is rationed and households cannot
borrow as much as they would like at the current interest rate.16 Once these
constraints are removed, household indebtedness usually rises, as shown in
Figures 5 and 6 for eight countries; the period where deregulation took place,
marked by a grey band, is frequently followed by a rapid increase in
indebtedness.17 By contrast, Canada has always had a fairly deregulated home
loan market (Edey and Hviding 1995; Freedman 1998), and never experienced the
rapid run-up in debt seen in Australia, New Zealand, Sweden or the UK, which
reﬂected pent-up demand following the removal of restrictions.
Some of the increase in indebtedness may have been due to existing home owners
withdrawing housing equity, for example by reﬁnancing and increasing their
mortgages or by taking out a home equity loan. Households could also withdraw
equity indirectly, for example if a household that inherits a house that was owned
outright sells it to a household that took out a mortgage to make the purchase,
and either consumes the proceeds or channels them into non-housing assets.
This would result in higher consumption but not necessarily higher dwelling
prices. Still, the removal of credit constraints on mortgage borrowers enables
some households who previously did not own a home to purchase one, and some
existing home owners to upgrade to a better home. This should be expected to
result in increased effective demand for owner-occupied housing and therefore
upward pressure on dwelling prices.
The rapid build-up in household indebtedness, however, appears to be more
closely associated with a reduction in inﬂation to low levels. Figures 5 and 6 show
16 Duca and Rosenthal (1994) found that borrowing constraints lowered the US owner-occupation
rate by around 8 percentage points, disproportionately affecting young households.
17 Appendix B contains the sources we used to construct the dates of the period of ﬁnancial
deregulation in each country.24




























































that the most rapid increases in debt have occurred in Australia, New Zealand and
the UK, where disinﬂation has followed ﬁnancial deregulation. This suggests that
disinﬂation dominates deregulation as a precondition for rising household debt.
It is also worth noting that in Australia, the full beneﬁts of ﬁnancial deregulation25
did not accrue to households until the 1990s, with ﬁnancial intermediaries mainly
directing their lending toward businesses in the 1980s (Stevens 1997).
Even with a deregulated ﬁnancial sector, high inﬂation will still constrain
household debt because some imperfections and information asymmetries remain.
Mortgage contracts are usually based on regular repayments ﬁxedi nnominal
terms. Given this, ﬁnancial institutions will only lend to households as much
as they can reasonably service on their current incomes; in Australia, most
ﬁnancial intermediaries impose a maximum loan size corresponding to a
repayment-to-income ratio of around 30 per cent. It is the nominal interest rate,
not the real rate, that determines this repayment ratio. Therefore the higher is
inﬂation, and thus the higher are nominal rates, the more households are affected
by this market imperfection and excluded from the home loan market (Lessard
and Modigliani 1975; Stevens 1997). Disinﬂation will therefore unambiguously
increase demand for owner-occupied housing, although this effect may have been
dampened in countries such as the United States, where mortgage interest is
deductible. Existing home owners will be able to upgrade, current renters will
be more likely to be able to move into home ownership, and new households may
form as an endogenous response to the reduced costs of mortgage ﬁnance.18 This
increased the effective demand for housing, resulting in higher housing prices and
a relatively static home-ownership rate.
Deregulation and disinﬂation certainly affected household debt, but it did not
necessarily follow that dwelling wealth-income ratios increased in all countries.
Growth in dwelling wealth after deregulation and disinﬂation largely reﬂects the
difference between its actual level in the regulated period and its putative desired
level. The relationship between the actual and desired level was determined by the
extent to which distortions in the housing market offset the effects of high inﬂation
andﬁnancial regulation. We have already seen that these policies were not uniform
across countries (see Table 3). In the presence of credit constraints, mortgage
interest deductibility and capital gains exemptions on the family home in the UK
and US made dwellings very attractive relative to other investments. This may
have workedto offset the effects ofregulation and thuscloser align actual dwelling
18 Poterba (1984) suggests that the interaction between inﬂation and mortgage interest
deductibility could have explained the strong growth in US house prices during the 1970s.
However, demographic factors such as the entry of the baby-boom generation into its
house-buying years have also been cited as a potential cause (Mankiw and Weil 1989).26
wealth with its desired level. Furthermore, mortgage interest deductibility in the
UK and US would have ameliorated the burden that high inﬂation placed on
mortgage borrowers; Britten-Jones and McKibbin (1989) found that changes in
mortgage interest deductibility have a much larger effect on the housing market
than changes in income taxes. These factors combined to mean that the actual
level of dwelling wealth under regulation was possibly closer to its desired level
than was the case in Australia.19 That dwelling wealth-income ratios in the US and
UK are currently around their 1980 level is consistent with this point (see Table 2).
Fewer housing market distortions in Australia and New Zealand made the relative
constraint placed on dwelling wealth by high inﬂation and ﬁnancial regulation
more binding. These constraints seem to have disproportionately affected cities
that would otherwise have had high housing costs. The suppression of this urban
structure effect widened the gap between actual dwelling wealth and its desired
level. It took ﬁnancial deregulation and disinﬂation to release this effect, and since
then dwelling prices have respondedaccordingly, with the largest increasesseen in
Sydney and more recently Melbourne. It is therefore possible that national average
dwelling wealth has been able to rise to its long-run level, now that housing
prices in these cities are no longer constrained by these regulations. This may
explain why Australia’s dwelling wealth-income ratio has increased relative to
other countries, from around the international average to well above it.
On the other hand,if the combined effects ofhigh inﬂation andﬁnancial regulation
had kept housing prices artiﬁcially low, they may also have had an effect on the
current composition of the dwellings stock. These constraints on purchase prices
would have affected building costs very little, so most of the effect would have
manifested in land prices. Although home buyers may have been constrained
from paying as much as they would in a deregulated environment, the artiﬁcially
low land prices might have allowed inframarginal home buyers to purchase a
higher-quality home than they would if prices had been higher. In particular,
they might have been able to purchase a home that used more land. This might
go some way to explaining the greater prevalence of detached houses in the
Australian housing stock which, as alluded to in Section 2.2, might indicate a
19 In the UK, some of this incentive would have been undermined by the existence of a large
public-housing sector. Pent-up demand for dwellings was unleashed in the late 1980s when
some public housing was privatised (Henley 1999).27
more land-intensive component to past demand for new housing than occurred in
other countries.
Because the stock of housing greatly exceeds the ﬂow of new building, it takes a
long time for the characteristics of the stock to adjust to structural change such
as a new post-deregulation equilibrium price. Therefore although the equilibrium
price of housing may have risen following these changes, the aggregate value
of the housing stock might be above its long-run level because the composition
of the housing stock is yet to adjust fully. Now that land prices are no longer
held down by inﬂation and ﬁnancial regulation, people will tend to choose less
land-intensive housing than in the past, supporting the trend to medium-density
housing, especially in the larger cities.
5. A Two-factor Model of City Populations
As discussed by Krugman (1996), models generating power laws for their size
distributions generally involve the interplay of a centripedal force encouraging
population into large agglomerations, balanced by a centrifugal force such as
congestion costs, that limits this tendency to agglomeration. In this section, we
outline a simpliﬁed model that generates Zipf’s Law for some parameter values,
primate cities for others, and ﬂat rank-size relationships similar to that in Australia
for others.20 Although this model clearly excludes some important details of
the evolution and growth of cities, it captures some essential features that may
generate insights about the forces driving both the urban structure and relative
housing costs seen in Australia.
The householdlocation decisioninvolvesa trade-offin which householdscompare
the employment beneﬁts that large cities offer, against the increased costs of
congestion, proxied by high dwelling prices. In our model, two types of ﬁrms
demand labour: local and national ﬁrms. Local ﬁrms sell only into the city market
they are in, and compete only with other ﬁrms in that city. The number of such
ﬁrms is random but roughly proportional to city populations. National ﬁrms on
the other hand sell into the entire national market and locate so as to minimise
transport and land costs. This creates a tendency for national ﬁrms to locate in
the largest city and fosters the formation of large agglomerations, although this
20 The details of the model are provided in Appendix A.28
is partly offset by land costs which we proxy by housing costs. However, the
size of cities is constrained by housing costs, which rise with population size.
Since households prefer to minimise commuting times, they are willing to pay a
premium to live close to the city centre. This tends to raise housing prices as the
city grows, discouraging the formation of large agglomerations.
The relative importance of these two effects depends upon two key parameters:
the share of national ﬁrms in the economy (β) and transport costs (θ). Our model
assumes the birth rate in city i is a random variable that has a common variance
across cities and a mean that is scaled by attractiveness of that city relative to
the national average of all cities. For each pair of values for the parameters β
and θ,w econduct 500 simulations, each of 500 periods for a country of 100
cities. When the share of national ﬁrms is small, we can generate rank-size
relationships consistent with Zipf’s Law. However, as β and θ rise, the Zipf curve
tends to ﬂatten as the largest city commands an increasing share of the population
and the national average house price rises. This distinguishes our model from
previous random growth models which could only generate city size distributions
consistent with Zipf’s Law, and not deviations from it. Moreover, our model
of city formation captures the Australian experience: countries with relatively
small populations (high β) spread over large distances (high θ) will have more
concentrated populations and higher average housing costs than countries without
these characteristics.
6. Conclusion
Economic researchers have long recognised the potential for demographic factors
to drive medium-term outcomes in the labour market and ﬁnancial asset returns.
This paper argues that spatial aspects of demography are important for the level of
non-ﬁnancial wealth and housing costs. We argue that Australia’s ﬂat Zipf curve
is a result of its federal political system and sparse population, which interact
to produce multiple primate cities. The relationship between these primate cities
arises because some serve as national centres to a greater extent than others, and
therefore attract relatively more population from the small towns than do the
smaller primate cities (state capitals).
The link from urban structure to average dwelling prices is more subtle. Given
that large cities have higher housing costs, the argument that national average29
dwelling prices will be higher in countries with a larger share of their population
concentrated in large cities would seem to be a matter of arithmetic. However,
this cannot be the only explanation of the pattern of Australia’s household wealth
– otherwise, we would see Canada’s wealth having a similar composition and
Germany’s less similar. Sweden would have had a much higher share of dwelling
wealth had it not been for its large public and co-operative sectors holding market
dwelling prices down.
If our arguments about the link between urban structure and national average
dwelling prices are right, we would expect that dwelling wealth will be higher
relative to income in Australia than in other countries, in the long run. This implies
that housing debt-income ratios could be higher in equilibrium in Australia than
elsewhere, without this being a cause for concern. If so, the rapid build-up of
housing indebtedness over the 1990s may still have some way to go. Nonetheless,
growthinhousingpricesanddebtwill still havetoleveloutatsomestage,tomatch
nominal income growth in the long run. As has already occurred in New Zealand,
the windfall gains that accrued to home owners over the 1980s and 1990s will
ultimately end.
However, our estimate of the effect of urban structure on dwelling wealth accounts
for only one-third – or at best, one-half – of the gap between Australian and
US dwelling wealth-income ratios. This may suggest that dwelling prices are
too high in Australia and must ultimately fall relative to household income.
Fortunately, the prospect of a sudden crash in dwelling prices similar to that
seen in the UK in the early 1990s seems remote. Australia’s unusually high
dwelling wealth-income ratio has built up over ﬁfteen years, not in a brief period
of speculation, and the speciﬁc circumstances that contributed to that boom-bust
cycle do not apply here (Muellbauer 1992; Henley 1999; Bean 2000). It would
seem more likely that such an adjustment would occur through an extended period
of slow or zero growth in dwelling prices, and perhaps partly through a shift in the
composition of the dwelling stock towards higher-densityhomes rather than prices
of particular dwellings falling. Whether that adjustment caused ﬁnancial distress
in some segments of the household sector would depend on whether households
had over-extended themselves, in the erroneous belief that dwelling prices would
continue to grow strongly.30
Given the urban structure of Australia and the concentration of high-income
employment opportunities in just two cities, it seems likely that Australia
will continue to have a pattern of household wealth being concentrated in
dwellings. This has important implications for macroeconomic factors such as
savings-investment balances, provision for retirement and the growth in and
distribution of wealth.
Finally, the level shiftin residential land valuesthat occurredover the past15 years
must have had implications for intergenerational wealth distribution. Households
that owned homes before ﬁnancial deregulation experienced windfall gains in
their dwelling wealth that will not be enjoyed by subsequent generations. While
inheritance will even out some of this redistribution in the future, the difference
between average age of home purchase and average age of inheritance implies
that these changes will still affect wealth holdings and saving behaviour over
households’ life cycles, with home purchase possibly occurring later in life than
is common today.31
Appendix A: A Model of City Formation and Dwelling Prices
Cities
There are N cities, with city i located at position li having population Pi and





iPi. The cities are randomly
placed around a circle, implying 0
  li
￿ 2π. This simpliﬁes the analysis while
at the same time being a reasonable approximation of Australia’s geography. The
















For the purpose of this paper, we assume that city locations are ﬁxed. However, it
may be possible to use models such as Krugman’s (1996) to extend our model to
allow city locations to be endogenous. We leave this task to future research.
Firms
There are two types of ﬁrm, local and country-wide.21 Firms are of equal size,
with the number and share of local ﬁrms in city i denoted F i and fi, and similarly
Ci and ci for national (country-wide) ﬁrms. We denote the share of national ﬁrms







Local ﬁrms (f-ﬁrms) sell only into the city market they are in, and compete only
with other ﬁrms in that city. Therefore their location decisions are driven by the
relative size (population share) of each city, and also inﬂuenced by the number of
local ﬁrms already in that city. The probability that a new local ﬁrm will choose to







  1 (A3)
where α is an index of the intensity of competition or substitutability of the new
ﬁrms’ output with the output of ﬁrms already in city i.
21 This distinction is a variant of the approach taken by the existing literature. For instance,
Krugman (1996) assumes two sectors: a geographically immobile sector (agriculture)
and an increasing returns, monopolistically competitive, geographically mobile sector
(manufacturing).32
If α
￿ 0 (local ﬁrms are monopolists selling differentiated goods), the model
reduces to a standard Bose-Einstein occupancy problem where growth in F i is
roughly proportionate to city i’s population (Hill 1974). If α
￿ 0, growth in F i
is less than proportionate to Pi when fi
￿ pi and more than proportionate when
fi
￿ pi.I nthe limit, fi will converge to pi and growth in the number of ﬁrms
will display the random proportionate growth required for Gibrat’s Law to hold.
Therefore, α does not affect the limiting behaviour of the model, but will help
determine its speed of convergence.
National ﬁrms (c-ﬁrms) sell into the entire national market and are not affected by
the location decisions of their competitors. New ﬁrms of this type locate so as to
minimise transport costs, which are assumed to be proportional to distance, and
land rent, which is assumed to be proportional to average dwelling price, hi. The















implies that most ﬁrms of this type will locate in the largest city, unless the largest
city is a long way from the rest of the population or land prices are particularly
high. We can interpret local ﬁrms as those in service and retail industries such as
restaurants, doctors, supermarkets and so on, while national ﬁrms are likely to be
in industries such as ﬁnance or manufacturing.
Housing costs
Households prefer to minimise commuting time and will therefore pay a premium
to live closer to the city centre. Assuming commuting times are linear in distance,
and that the premium paid for location is proportional to commuting time, then
house prices h vary linearly with distance from the centre, r. This is similar to
the early models of intra-city housing costs (Mills 1967; Muth 1969), although in












￿,i sset to zero for simplicity. Housing costs that are declining in distance33
from the centre ﬁti nwith the von-Th¨ unen-Millsmodels of land rent and allocation
around a central place (Mills 1967). If the city is circular, its area – equivalently,
population ornumberofdwellings – isPi
￿πR2.There are 2πr dwellings at radius



























This functional form dependson the assumptionof aﬁxed ﬂoor for housingprices;
prices at the very fringe of the city do not depend on the size of the city. It
is also possible that commuting times will vary more than proportionately with
distance from the centre, due to congestion. Alternatively, the development of
edge cities and increasing prevalence of employment opportunities in the suburbs
could mean that congestion costs rise less than proportionately with population
(Krugman 1995). However, this will not reverse the central result that average
housing prices are higher in larger cities, and that national average housing prices
are higher when the population is concentrated in a few centres. In the simulations
below, we deﬁne hi as
p




We assume a city’s attractiveness to households depends on three factors: the
availability of jobs, the absolute population of the city and the average level of








direct inclusion of city populations is intended to account for the observed wage
premium seen in larger cities (Glaeser and Mar´ e 2001). This may reﬂect either
that search costs are lower in larger labour markets, or that larger markets allow
for greater specialisation, which raises wages. In addition, larger cities have more
diverse industrial structures and thus may be attractive locations to a wider range
of workers (Gabaix 1999b).
Housing costs work against these forces encouraging greater agglomeration.
Although there may be other disadvantages to living in large cities, such as
congestion, pollution and crime, we take housing costs as a proxy for all of these
costs, given that they are monotonic in city population. Since the attractiveness
of a city, u
￿
 
￿ represents the utility it offers to its residents, we assume that it34
has a fairly standard functional form, the Cobb-Douglas function. This ensures































Following Gabaix (1999a), we assume that in each period t, gt P new households
are born and δP households die; the death rate δ is constant across time and across
cities.22 Total births nationwide are random, with the growth rate gt distributed
lognormally with mean γ and a variance that depends on σ2. The allocation of
new households to cities is determined by the attractiveness of that city relative to
the national average of all cities. This relative attractiveness is scaled so that their











We deﬁne the birth rate in city i, git as a lognormal random variable with common
variance σ2 and a mean that is scaled by the relative attractiveness of that city in
that period. The scaling factor used in the deﬁnition of relative attractiveness (A8)





Importantly, we do not assume that all (new) households move to whichever is the
most attractive city, as this would result in the system having unstable dynamics.
Depending on the relative importance of housing costs versus employment
opportunities, either the largest city would then increase without limit while the
other cities fade away at rate δ,o rthe smallest, cheapest, city would attract all
the new population and become large. If the smallest city attracts the population,
it is then no longer the most attractive city, and the city that had previously
been the second-smallest attracts all the new population in the following period.
The functional forms for the utility and housing-price relations used here result







 λ is very different from µ
￿2, the (unbounded) city population
effect dominates the effect of job availability in the long run. This does not
22 We assume that each household contains one person.35
materially distort the simulation results presented below, as the net effect of city
population remains fairly small for the range of populations considered.
By contrast, allowing random growth in all cities captures the reality of the
process of birth or household formation, while allowing households to respond
to economic forces by having some change location. Random growth with a mean
depending on economic factors effectively captures moving costs – it is not always
advantageous to move to the most attractive city – and unobserved heterogeneity –
not everyonewill want to move even if it would beneﬁt the median new household.
Alternatively, these costs and individual variation could be modelled, but only
by adding many free parameters and functional forms without much theoretical
guidance to pin them down. In our view, this would add complexity to the model
without adding much explanatory power.
One ﬁnal adjustment is required to prevent city populations from being zero. The









where ε is a small positive number which we set equal to 1. Gabaix (1999b)
showed that random proportionate growth with a lower bound on population,
which he termed a Kesten process, will generate Zipf’s Law in the upper tail of a
size distribution.
Simulation results
The results in this Appendix are based on an extensive exploration of the model
for a range of parameters. For each pair of values for the parameters β and θ,w e
conducted 500 simulations, each of 500 periods for a country of 100 cities. The α
parameter does not affect the long-run results, so we set it to 0
￿5 throughout. The
mean birth rate γ was set to 0
￿03 and the death rate δ to 0
￿02. The parameters in the




￿15, so large cities are on balance
more attractive than smaller ones even when the labour market in each city is in
equilibrium. Similar results are obtained within a signiﬁcant neighbourhood of
these parameter values. The ﬁgures below show the median ﬁnal-period outcome
and the 5th and 95th percentile of those 500 cases, for dwelling prices, the
largest city’s share of the total population and the slope of the ‘Zipf curve’, or
log rank-log size relationship, for the top 50 cities. We ﬁnd that the rank-size36
relationship tends to ﬂatten out after this point. This is in line with the ﬁnding
that random growth generates Zipf’s Law in the upper tail of the distribution,
but not necessarily for the whole sample (Gabaix 1999b; Hill 1974); a simple
Kesten process as in Equation (A10), where git is a random variable drawn from
a common distribution, will generate a Zipf curve with a linear segment covering
about half to two-thirds of the sample.
If the share of national ﬁrms in the economy β is small, say, less than about
0
￿05, our model generates rank-size curves roughly consistent with Zipf’s Law
(Figure A1). As β rises, the simulations tend to generate ﬂatter Zipf curves, with
slopes around 0
￿5–0
￿7.With β above about 0
￿4, a primate city is almost guaranteed
(Figure A2).

























0.02 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
θ = 100
θ = 1 000 θ = 10 000




































As expected, increasing importance of national ﬁrms (β) and transport costs (θ)
both result in the largest city having a larger share of total population. Flatter
Zipf curves and large primate cities imply higher national average dwelling prices
(Figure A3). This seems in line with Australia’s situation: countries with relatively
small populations (high β) spread over large distances (high θ) will have more
concentrated populations and higher average housing costs than countries without
these characteristics.37
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Figure A3: Simulation Results – National Average Dwelling Prices
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The model we have used is not a complete model of city formation. In particular,
we have left many stylised features of the economics of cities as exogenous
factors, such as the wage premium paid in large cities. The location decisions
of households and ﬁrms are assumed to depend only on current-period payoffs. In
a more complex model, agents would be forward-looking instead of myopic, but
as Neary (2001) argues, and Baldwin (1999) demonstrates for the core-periphery38
model, this added complexity does not affect the model’s comparative-statics
predictions. We also generated the higher housing costs in larger cities observed
in Section 2.3 by geographic construction; a more sophisticated model would
allow residents to respond to housing costs by endogenously adjusting the
size and quality of new dwellings. Although random birth of households is
biologically justiﬁable, the random allocation of local ﬁrms (f-ﬁrms) is less
justiﬁable on economic grounds. Recent research has developed models that can
explain these features as endogenous outcomes of microeconomic behaviour, at
the cost of considerable extra complexity and computational burden (Axtell and
Florida 2001). Nonetheless, our model illustrates that a few simple variations on a
random-growth model can generate rank-size distributions that match the data for
a range of countries reasonably well.39
Appendix B: Data Sources
Population
For Australia, Australian Demographic Statistics, ABS Cat No 3101.0
(March 2000 release). Population of all towns and cities with more than
4 900 inhabitants from the 1996 Census, available at <URL:http://www.abs.
gov.au>.F or Canada, data are estimates for 1999, taken from the Statistics
Canada website, available at <URL:http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/
Population/demo05.htm>.F or New Zealand, data are from the 1996 Census
(Statistics New Zealand). For the United States, MSA and CSMA population data
for 1999 were taken from the Bureau of Census website, available at <URL:
http://www.census.gov>.F or all other countries, city population data from the
United Nations Statistics Division Population Database, available at <URL:http:
//www.un.org/Depts/unsd/demog/ctry.htm>.
Table 3
Mortgage interest deductibility: OECD (1994).
Capital gains tax exemption: OECD (1994).
Share of public housing: Australia [1999]: Australian Social Trends, ABS
Cat No 4102.0; Canada: Statistics Canada website; France, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, United Kingdom: European Parliament (1996); Japan [1998]:
1998 Housing and Land Survey of Japan, Statistics Bureau and Statistics
Center; New Zealand: Statistics New Zealand [1996 Census] and Ministry
of Housing; United States [1997]:authors’ calculation based on the number
of public housing units reported by the US Department of Housing and
Urban Development and the total housing stock from American Housing
Survey 1999.
Home ownership rates: Australia [1999]: ABS Cat No 4102.0.Canada: Statistics
Canada [Census and related data 1999]; France [1996], Germany [1998],
Italy [1991], United Kingdom [1998]: Haffner and Dol (2000); Japan
[1998]: Housing of Japan, Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center; Sweden:
Oswald (1999); New Zealand [1996]: Statistics New Zealand [1996
Census]; United States [1999]: US Census Bureau.40
Table 4
Persons per room: United Nations Statistics Division, available at <URL:http:
//www.un.org/Depts/unsd/social/housing.htm>.
Average existing dwelling size: Australia: authors’ calculation based on ﬂoor
space per person for Melbourne from the USAID Housing Indicators
Project [1993] and persons per household from ABS Cat No 4102.0;
Canada [1985]: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation; France
[1996], Germany [1998], Italy [1985], Sweden [1997]: Haffner and
Dol (2000); Japan [1998]: 1998 Housing and Land Survey of Japan,
Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center; New Zealand [mid 1990s]:
Valuation New Zealand Sales Data as cited in Bourassa and Hoesli (1999);
United Kingdom: English House Condition Survey 1996, Department of
Environment, Transport and the Regions; United States [1997]: American
Housing Survey 1999, Census Bureau.
Average new dwelling size: Australia [1999]: ABS Cat No 4102.0; France
[1998], Germany [1999], Italy [1996], Sweden [1998], United Kingdom
[average1980–1996]:HaffnerandDol(2000);Japan[1998]:1998Housing
and Land Survey of Japan, Statistics Bureau and Statistics Center; United
States [1999]: National Association of Home Builders.
Proportion of dwellings houses: Australia [1998]: ABS Cat No 4102.0; Canada:
Statistics Canada [Census and related data 1999]; France [1996], Germany
[1998], Sweden [1998]: Haffner and Dol (2000); New Zealand [1996]:
Statistics New Zealand; United Kingdom [1996]: English House Condition
Survey; United States [1997]: American Housing Survey 1999.
Proportion of dwellings detached: Australia [1998]: ABS Cat No 4102.0;
Canada: Statistics Canada [Census and related data 1999]; Germany
[1997]: Miron (2001); Japan [1993]: Building Council of Japan (1998);
New Zealand [mid 1990s]: Valuation New Zealand Sales Data as cited
in Bourassa and Hoesli (1999); United Kingdom [1996]: English House
Condition Survey; United States [1997]: American Housing Survey 1999.41
Dwellings with six or more rooms: Australia [1999]:AustralianHousingSurvey,
ABS Cat No 4182.0; Canada [1996], France [1996], Germany [1997],
United Kingdom [1996/97], United States [1997], New Zealand [1996]:
Miron (2001).
Dwellings built since 1980: Australia: authors’ calculation based on Census data
and building completions (ABS Cat No 8752.0); France [1996], Germany
[1998], Sweden [1990], United Kingdom [1996]: Haffner and Dol (2000);
Japan [1998]: 1998 Housing and Land Survey of Japan, Statistics Bureau
and Statistics Center; United States [1997]: American Housing Survey
1999.
Figure 1, Table 5, Table 7 and Table 8: Actual and Counterfactual Dwelling
Price-Income Ratios
Australian housing prices by city: CBA/HIA Housing Report and, for Hobart,
Real Estate Institute of Australia. The data in Figure 1 are for December
2000. The data in Tables 5, 7 and 8 are for June 1998.
Australian median household gross income by city: ABSHouseholdExpenditure
Survey 1998-1999 (median income provided as a special data service). In
Figure 1, income is deﬂated by national accounts gross household income
(ABS Cat No 5206.0).
Australian average household disposable income: NationalIncome,Expenditure
and Product, (ABS Cat No 5206.0). The number used is an average of
quarterly data for 1998.
US housing prices by city: National Association of Realtors, available at <URL:
http://nar.realtor.com/databank/ehsmet.htm>.
US national average housing prices: Mylonas et al (2000).
US median household gross income by city: Census Bureau Current Population
Survey, Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates for 1997, available at
<URL:http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/stcty/estimate.html>.42
US average household disposable income: Survey of Current Business May
2000,T able 2.1, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce;
US Census Bureau Household and Housing Unit Estimates 1998,
available at <URL:http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/housing/
sthuhh1.txt>.
Figures 5 and 6: Dates of Financial Deregulation
The dates of ﬁnancial deregulation correspond to the period when interest rate
ceilings on deposits and loans, and quantitative restrictions on bank lending were
lifted in each country.
Australia: Battellino and McMillan (1989).
Canada: Edey and Hviding (1995); Freedman (1998); Germany and
Morton (1985); OECD (2000).
France, Italy and Sweden: OECD (2000).
New Zealand: OECD (2000); Margaritis, Hyslop and Rae (1992).
United Kingdom: Germany and Morton (1985); OECD (2000).
United States: Edey and Hviding (1995); Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990); Mehrez and
Kaufmann (1999).43
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